What has been published

The Department of Health and Social Care has published the first official statistics describing medicine supply disruption notifications across the UK. From October 2020 to June 2026, the reporting portal received 8,670 supply issue notifications and 3,320 discontinuation notifications. In June 2026 alone, manufacturers submitted 133 supply issue notifications and 47 discontinuation notifications. The figures create a national time series for reports entering the central system. They do not count medicines missing from every pharmacy or the number of patients who could not receive treatment.1, 2

The release appeared on 5 August and presents data to the end of June. A supply issue is defined as a situation in which a manufacturer's available supply does not meet anticipated demand at national level. A discontinuation means the permanent cessation of a particular presentation. These are related but different events. A product can be discontinued without an immediate patient level shortage if alternatives and stock are available, while a temporary disruption can require action even though the product will return.1, 2

The first half of 2026 produced 687 supply issue notifications and 191 discontinuation notifications. Monthly supply issue reports were 101 in January, 112 in February, 150 in March, 91 in April, 100 in May and 133 in June. The month to month variation shows reporting activity, not a direct severity index. One complex shortage can affect many patients, while several notifications can involve presentations with limited impact. The data cannot be used to declare June safer or worse than March without further evidence.1, 2

The series begins in October 2020 because that is when the DaSH reporting portal launched. It should not be used to infer that disruption itself began then or to make a like for like comparison with earlier reporting routes. The department may revise figures as records are improved. Counts below five are suppressed in detailed tables for disclosure control. These design choices are important when small categories appear blank or totals do not reproduce every visible cell.1, 2

Manufacturing leads the reported causes

For 2025, manufacturers reported 1,411 supply issue notifications. Manufacturing factors were recorded against 871, equivalent to 62 per cent. Legal, regulatory, market and demand factors appeared against 522, or 37 per cent. Logistics appeared against 72, or five per cent, and major events against 15, or one per cent. The percentages can add to more than 100 because a notification may have more than one cause. They describe causes selected in reports, not an independent finding that one factor alone produced each disruption.2, 3

The detailed categories show a varied system. Customer demand or surge was associated with 271 notifications in 2025, delay in the supply chain with 263, other manufacturing issues with 238 and shortage of raw materials or packaging with 183. Capacity was recorded against 110, and licensing, regulatory or enforcement matters against 106. These categories indicate where resilience can fail, but the dataset does not publish enough case detail to attribute an individual local shortage or decide which mitigation would have prevented it.2, 3

The annual number of supply issue notifications fell from 1,942 in 2024 to 1,411 in 2025. That is a change in recorded notifications, not proof that the effect on patients fell by the same proportion. The mix of products, duration, therapeutic alternatives and distribution can all change. A lower count could include a small number of severe disruptions, while a higher count could include early warnings successfully managed before stock reached clinical services. Impact needs separate evidence.2, 3

The value of the cause data lies in its system view. Repeated manufacturing and supply chain factors support work on forecasting, diversified production, regulatory coordination and early communication. They do not give a ward or community team an instruction for a specific medicine. Local action must use current national alerts, pharmacy advice, stock information and approved clinical guidance. A broad statistical trend should never be used as authority to substitute, ration or stop treatment for an individual patient.2, 3

What a notification does not mean

A notification is an event in a regulatory and operational reporting process. Manufacturers have duties to report shortages and discontinuations, allowing the department and partners to assess and manage risk. The count is not a live inventory. Stock may remain in wholesalers, hospitals or community pharmacies after a report, and availability can differ by pack, strength, formulation and place. Conversely, a service can experience local difficulty even when the national definition of unmet demand has not been reached.3, 4

The statistics do not report the number of unique products affected in a way that can be assumed from the notification total. Related presentations or updates may generate separate records, and one report may concern a nationally important item. Nor do they show how long each issue lasted, how many patients changed treatment or whether clinical harm occurred. Those missing dimensions are acknowledged limits, not reasons to disregard the series. They mark the boundary between surveillance of notifications and evaluation of consequences.3, 4

A discontinuation is also not necessarily a surprise. Manufacturers may give advance notice, allowing the health system to plan alternatives before supply ends. The policy framework describes mitigation through communication, sourcing, regulatory action and clinical management. Some changes will still be difficult, especially where alternatives are limited or patients need careful conversion. The statistical category alone cannot distinguish an orderly planned transition from a discontinuation that creates urgent pressure.3, 4

Language therefore matters when briefing staff or patients. Saying that more than 12,000 shortage and discontinuation events affected patients would go beyond the data. The defensible statement is that the portal received 8,670 supply issue and 3,320 discontinuation notifications over the stated period. A local service should then describe the exact product, current supply position, affected patients and approved response from its own verified information.3, 4

The nursing safety task

Nurses are often the first to see the practical effect of a supply change. A medicine may arrive in a different strength, pack, device or formulation. Administration times may change, or an alternative may require monitoring and patient education. These differences create risk even when an appropriate substitute exists. Teams need a controlled briefing that identifies what changed, which patients are affected, how prescriptions and records will be updated and where to obtain clinical advice.4, 5

Substitution is not an informal workaround. The authority required depends on the medicine, setting and proposed change. A nurse should not alter dose, route, product or schedule outside an authorised prescription, patient group direction or other lawful mechanism. Pharmacy and the responsible prescriber should support decisions, with high risk medicines receiving particular scrutiny. Verbal messages and memory are insufficient when several similar products or strengths are in use.4, 5

Storage and selection controls may need temporary revision. An unfamiliar presentation placed in the usual location can be mistaken for the original product. Barcodes, electronic systems and smart pumps may not recognise a replacement without configuration. Services should assess look alike and sound alike risk, separate stock where necessary and give staff access to the current instruction at the point of use. A temporary label should have an owner and review date so it does not become permanent undocumented practice.4, 5

Patients need an explanation that is truthful without causing avoidable alarm. They should know whether the medicine, appearance, device or instructions have changed and what to do if supply is interrupted. People who use monitored dosage systems, homecare services or carers may need coordinated information across several providers. Staff should not promise a resupply date unless it is confirmed, and they should record important counselling and consent where a treatment decision changes.4, 5

Building a reliable local response

Every organisation needs a route that turns national intelligence into a local, clinically owned plan. Pharmacy teams can verify stock, alternatives and anticipated duration. Medical and nursing leaders can assess which groups face the greatest risk and what monitoring is required. Procurement, governance and communications may also be involved. The output should be one current instruction, not several forwarded messages with conflicting dates. Staff need to know where the authoritative version sits and how urgent questions are escalated.4, 5, 3

Patient identification should be proportionate to the risk. For a common item with a straightforward equivalent, routine prescribing controls may be enough. For a medicine with a narrow therapeutic index, complex device or no close alternative, services may need an active list and individual review. Searches should include relevant care settings and recent transfers. Data handling must remain within the approved purpose, with access limited to people organising the response.4, 5, 3

Stock conservation decisions require ethical and clinical governance. First come, first served may disadvantage people who face access barriers, while silent rationing at the bedside makes inequity invisible. If prioritisation is necessary, criteria should be evidence based, documented, consistently applied and reviewed as supply changes. Exceptions need a route for senior clinical decision. Nurses should not be left to resolve scarcity alone during an administration round or clinic.4, 5, 3

After the issue resolves, the temporary controls must be withdrawn safely. Remaining alternative stock, changed prescriptions, patient instructions and electronic alerts need reconciliation. A rapid review can identify near misses, extra workload and communication failures. Learning should improve the response to the next disruption, not merely record that supply returned. The new national statistics make clear that notifications recur, so resilience needs a repeatable process rather than an improvised response each time.4, 5, 3

How to use the new series

At national level, the series can show whether reporting volume and cause patterns change over time. It can support questions about manufacturing resilience, regulation and demand management. Future releases will be more useful if they preserve consistent definitions and add carefully governed information about duration, product duplication and impact. Any additional detail must protect commercial and patient confidentiality, but current notification counts should not be treated as the final measure of medicine access.1, 2, 3, 4

At organisational level, the statistics can help leaders recognise that supply disruption is routine safety work. They cannot replace current alerts or pharmacy intelligence. Boards should ask whether the organisation has a tested response, can find affected patients, communicates changes reliably and records the workforce cost. Measures might include time to issue a local instruction, medication incidents during substitutions, unfilled doses and patient contacts, while avoiding targets that encourage under-reporting.1, 2, 3, 4

Information should be designed for the setting in which it will be used. A detailed pharmacy bulletin may support specialists but leave a nurse on a night shift unsure whether a prescribed dose can be given. A safe summary names the exact presentation, the effective date, the approved action and a contact for uncertainty. It should also say when normal practice resumes. Local systems need to remove superseded notices so staff do not act on an earlier version after the supply position changes.1, 2, 3, 4

National and local reporting should connect without duplicating avoidable burden. Frontline incident reports can reveal selection errors, omitted doses and distress that the manufacturer notification cannot measure. Pharmacy stock data can show actual availability, while patient contacts show access problems outside hospital. Bringing those signals together can identify harm and workload. It should be done through established governance and proportionate data collection, not a new spreadsheet created during every shortage and abandoned when pressure eases.1, 2, 3, 4

For individual nurses, the safest sequence is verification, escalation and documentation. Check the exact medicine, formulation, strength and local instruction. Escalate when the prescribed item is unavailable or the alternative does not match the authorised order. Document what was supplied, administered, omitted or explained. Report incidents and near misses through local systems. National notification numbers provide context, but safe care rests on the exact product and patient in front of the clinician.1, 2, 3, 4

The publication is an important transparency step because it makes the central reporting system visible. Its strongest message is not a single record high or low. It is that medicine supply depends on manufacturing, regulation, logistics and demand, and that a notification begins a management process rather than describing its outcome. Nurses need timely, specific guidance at the bedside, and policymakers need evidence about patient impact if they are to judge whether that process is working.1, 2, 3, 4